Conduct and Belief: Public Employees' First
Amendment Rights to Free Expression and
Political Affiliation
Craig D. Singer t
Two lines of Supreme Court decisions define the extent to
which the Constitution protects public employees1 from dismissal
for the exercise of their First Amendment rights.2 The first set of
cases governs the employees' right to speak on matters of public
concern; the second governs their right to political affiliation. However, the Court has not explained the relationship between these
two approaches. As a result, lower courts have had difficulty determining which line of precedent applies to a case in which both
overt expression and political affiliation might have influenced an
employee's firing.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. Paula Partisan worked as a mid-level employee in the office of a city mayor.
Last November, she supported her boss, Ida Incumbent, in Ida's
re-election bid. During the campaign, a local newspaper accurately
quoted Paula as saying: "As a member of the Platypus Party of
America, I support Ida Incumbent over Carl Contender." Despite
Paula's opposition, Carl won in a landslide, and fired Paula in his
very first official act as mayor. Believing that her First Amendment
rights have been violated, Paula sues. How should the court approach her case?
Either or both of the two lines of cases noted above might govern Partisanv Contender. The first line, beginning with Pickering
v Board of Education,3 measures the extent of an employee's right
t B.A. 1990, Wesleyan University; J.D. Candidate 1993, The University of Chicago.
I By "public employees," this Comment refers only to those employees of federal, state,
or local governments whom the government may fire for any reason (i.e., "at will") not violative of the Constitution. This Comment does not address civil service employees, whose

First Amendment rights pose different constitutional questions.
' The relevant text of the First Amendment reads:
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.
US Const, Amend I.
3 391 US 563 (1968).
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to speak on matters of public concern. In these cases, the Court
has applied a balancing test which weighs the employee's First
Amendment right against the government's interest in firing the
employee for exercising that right.4
The second line of cases, beginning with Elrod v Burns5 and
clarified by Branti v Finkel,6 involves patronage dismissals. These
cases address whether and to what extent an incoming public official may fire employees because of their political affiliation with
the outgoing administration.7 In these affiliation cases, the Court
has adopted a categorical rule that the First Amendment uniformly forbids patronage dismissals except when the employer can
demonstrate that "party affiliation is an appropriate requirement
for the effective performance of the public office involved." 8 Unlike
the overt speech cases, the political affiliation cases do not require
lower courts to apply a case-by-case balancing test.9
The existence of two separate doctrines for similar situations
has confounded lower courts. Courts differ on how to approach
cases like Paula's, because both overt speech and political affiliation may have played a role in the employer's decision to fire the
public employee. Which test the court will apply depends primarily on the court's view of the relationship between the two lines of
Supreme Court precedent. The two lines of cases share, at least
superficially, similar constitutional concerns and similar interests
of the parties. Accordingly, several courts have concluded that the
patronage cases are a narrow subset of the Pickering expression
cases. 10 These courts have interpreted all of the First Amendment
cases as falling on a spectrum measured by the magnitude of the
employer's interest in firing the expressive employee." By contrast,
other courts have viewed the Pickering cases and the Elrod cases
as governing entirely separate situations. 2

Id at 568.
- 427 US 347 (1976).
6 445 US 507 (1980).
' Elrod, 427 US at 349; Branti, 445 US at 508.
' Branti, 445 US at 518.
" For a discussion of the differences between the case-by-case balancing approach of
Pickeringand the "categorical" approach of Elrod,and for an analysis of the merits of these
approaches, see Note, Politics and the Non-Civil Service Public Employee: A Categorical
Approach to First Amendment Protection, 85 Colum L Rev 558 (1985).
10 See McBee v Jim Hogg County, 730 F2d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir 1984) (en banc); Jones v
Dodson, 727 F2d 1329, 1334 n 6 (4th Cir 1984).
"' McBee, 730 F2d at 1014.
12 See, for example, Barnes v Bosley, 745 F2d 501, 506 (8th Cir 1984).
4
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This Comment proposes a view of the relationship between
Pickering and Elrod that relies upon a version of the "separate
tests" paradigm. It concludes that the "unified spectrum" view
lacks internal consistency, tends to unnecessarily restrict the scope
of Elrod, and reads Elrod poorly. By contrast, a "separate tests"
approach adheres more faithfully to the language and spirit of the
precedents because the patronage cases and the speech cases involve different First Amendment rights and different state interests. These differences, in turn, explain the divergent standards
the Court has used to judge the constitutionality of the state
action.
Section I of this Comment describes Pickering and Elrod and
their progeny. Section II explores several lower court approaches to
cases in which the Pickering and Elrod tests conflict. Section III
critiques these approaches and proposes a new way to resolve conflicts between the two lines of cases. Finally, Section IV proposes a
causation test for determining which of the two precedents should
govern ambiguous cases.
I. PUBLIC
A.

EMPLOYEES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Overt Expression-The Speech Cases

1 3 the Supreme Court first
In Pickering v Board of Education,
articulated a general test for determining when a public employer
may dismiss an employee for speaking on matters of public concern. In Pickering,a schoolteacher sued for reinstatement after the
school board fired him for sending a letter critical of school board
policy to a local newspaper. 4 In an opinion by Justice Marshall,
the Court held that the school board could not deprive Pickering
15
of his right as a citizen to comment on matters of public concern.
At the same time, however, the Court recognized that the state has
16
an interest in regulating the speech of the teachers it employs.
Accordingly, the Court adopted a balancing test to determine
whether the state had constitutionally discharged Pickering. "The
problem in any case," the Court wrote, "is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an

13

"

391 US 563.
Id at 564.

"5Id
Is

Id.

at 568.
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employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."1
Pickering determined the extent of the state's efficiency interest on the basis of several important considerations, including (1)
the speech's effect on discipline by the employee's immediate supervisors;" s (2) its effect on harmony among the employee's coworkers; 9 (3) whether the relationship between the employee and
the employer against whom he spoke was a close one which required personal loyalty or confidence;2 0 (4) the speech's effect on
the employee's job performance; 2' and (5) its impact on the general
operation of the employer's enterprise.2 2 The Court found that all
of these factors favored the teacher on the facts of Pickering;
23
therefore, the school board acted unconstitutionally in firing him.
24
Fifteen years after Pickering, the case of Connick v Myers
revised and clarified the analysis in the earlier case. In an opinion'
by Justice White, the Court made explicit what it found to be implicit in Pickering: that the Pickering balancing test applies only
when the employee's speech touches on a matter of public concern. 25 "When employee, expression cannot be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary
26
in the name of the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, employee speech on matters of public concern
still merits consideration under the Pickering balance.27 In this regard, the Connick court followed Pickeringin recognizing that the
state has an important interest in the efficiency of its public enter-

Id.
'8 Id at 570-71.
17

29 Id.
21

Id.
Id at 572-73.

22

Id at 573.

23

Id at 569-73.

20

2, 461 US 138 (1983).
25 Id at 146.
26 Id (emphasis added). In Connick, the Court held that a questionnaire distributed by
an assistant district attorney did not, except for one question, involve matters of public
concern, because the questionnaire primarily addressed the internal workings of her office.
Therefore, her employer could fire her for distributing the questionnaire, without having to
face the Pickering test, except with regard to the one question dealing with public matters.
Id at 146-49, 154. After applying the Pickering test to that one question, the court resolved
the balance in favor of the employer. Id at 149-54.
2'7Id at 149-50.
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prise.25 Connick explained that the need for efficiency includes a
state interest in avoiding employee expression that might "disrupt
the office, undermine [the employer's] authority, and destroy close
'29
working relationships.
Still more recently, in Rankin v McPherson," the Court reaffirmed the vitality of the Pickeringtest for cases in which the employee's expression involves matters of public concern. Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, held that a deputy constable spoke
on a matter of public concern when she remarked, in response to
learning of an assassination attempt on President Reagan, "If they
go for him again, I hope they get him."' Because the speech was of
public concern, the Court held that the Pickering balancing test
32
governed, and it resolved the balance in favor of the deputy.
In balancing the employee's speech interest against the state's
efficiency interest, the Rankin court expanded Pickering'sdescription of the relevant factors for determining the weight of the
state's interest. Specifically, the Court observed that "some attention must be paid to the responsibilities of the employee within the
agency. The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the
words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public
accountability the employee's role entails."3 " In other words, the
more the employee's job requires confidentiality, policymaking, or
public contact, the greater the state's interest in firing her for expression that offends her employer. 4
B.

Political Affiliation-The Patronage Cases

The Rankin criteria for the state's interest mirror some of the
key issues in the patronage cases, which the Court decided in the
years between Pickering and Connick. During this period, the
Court issued two decisions that determined the extent of an incoming public official's ability to fire employees because of their
political loyalty to the previous administration.
In Elrod v Burns, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion held
that patronage firings infringe upon the First Amendment's guar2 Id at 150-51. See Pickering, 391 US at 568.
29 Connick, 461 US at 154.
30 483 US 378 (1987).
31 Id at 381, 386-87.
" Id at 388-89, 392.
33 Id at 390.
" Id at 390-91. In Rankin, the Court found a reduced state interest because the employee, although bearing the title of "deputy constable," performed the duties of a data
entry clerk. Id at 380-81.
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antee of free political belief and association. 5 To decide whether
the firings were constitutional, Brennan applied a "heightened
scrutiny" analysis: conditioning public employment on the employee's political affiliation "must further some vital government
end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and
association in achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the [infringement]."36
The plurality in Elrod first looked to the state's asserted need
for efficiency as a justification for patronage firings and determined
that this need was not sufficient, in this situation, to survive
heightened scrutiny.3 7 For three reasons, the plurality rejected the
argument that workers who do not share the controlling administration's political views will not work efficiently. First, it argued,
the inefficiency that inevitably results from wholesale patronage
firings undercuts the efficiency justification.3 8 Second, despite the
employer's fear that employees who belong to an opposing party
may subvert the public enterprise's efficacy, the plurality held that
"mere political association is an inadequate basis for imputing disposition to ill-willed conduct. '3 9 Finally, the plurality held that the
patronage firings to enstate could employ less drastic means than
40
courage employees to work efficiently.
The plurality next examined the state's asserted interest in
political loyalty. It agreed that the state might need politically
loyal employees to ensure that "policies which the electorate has
sanctioned are effectively implemented. ' 41 Thus, a political loyalty
interest might justify partisan firings-even where the state cannot
advance a valid efficiency justification. This result is possible because the two interests, loyalty and efficiency, each advance a distinct governmental value. Efficiency protects the effective day-today operation of the public enterprise. Political loyalty, on the
other hand, protects the political process from disloyal employees
who may try to thwart the goals of the duly elected
representatives.4 2

" 427 US 347, 355 (1976).
36Id at 363.
37 Id

at 364.

38Id.
39Id at 365.
40 Id at 366. Brennan pointed specifically to the availability of "for cause" discharges
and merit systems as less drastic means of ensuring efficiency in the government workforce.
Id.
" Id at 372.
42

Id at 367.
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Nevertheless, Justice Brennan determined that this government interest in political loyalty does not validate all patronage
firings. Instead, because heightened scrutiny requires the state to
employ the least restrictive alternative, courts should confine patronage dismissals to "policymaking" employees.4" This limitation
adequately serves the state's interest because "[n]onpolicymaking
individuals usually have only limited responsibility and are therefore not in a position to thwart the goals of the in-party."'44 Consequently, the constitutionality of a political firing turns on whether
or not the court characterizes the employee as a policymaker. The
state may fire a policymaker solely because of her political affiliation, but it may not do likewise with a nonpolicymaker. 45
Concurring in the judgment, Justices Stewart and Blackmun
addressed only the narrow question of "whether a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee can be discharged ...
upon the sole ground of his political beliefs. '46 Like the plurality,
they answered that question in the negative.47
Elrod, then, uses a one-dimensional test that differs substantially from the Pickering-Connick balancing test. While Pickering
requires a lower court to balance the interests anew in each case,
Elrod makes no such. demand. Instead, Elrod requires lower courts
to make a single, categorical determination: whether the employee
is a policymaker.
In Branti v Finkel,45 the Court revised the test for determining which employees the state may discharge for their political affiliation. While maintaining a categorical distinction among employees as the means of determining the constitutionality of
political firings, Justice Stevens's majority opinion set aside policymaking as the key consideration. 4 9 Instead, he wrote, "the ultimate inquiry is ... whether the hiring authority can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. ' 50 Aside from this

43
44

Id.
Id.

Id at 372.
11 Id at 375 (Stewart concurring in the judgment).
47 Id.
48 445 US 507 (1980).
41

49 Id

at 518.

50 Id. This Comment will continue, for brevity's sake, to refer to employees as "policymakers" and "nonpolicymakers," but Branti's standard now defines those terms.
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clarification, the Court in Branti did not purport to alter the anal5
ysis or holding of the plurality in Elrod. 1
In the recent case of Rutan v Republican Party of Illinois, the
Court held that the rule in Elrod and Branti extends beyond patronage firings to "promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions
2 Thus, the Court has
based on party affiliation and support .... ,,5
shown a willingness to broaden Elrod's protection of belief and as53
sociational rights beyond the precise facts of that case.
II.

LOWER COURT RESPONSES TO PICKERING-ELROD CLASHES

The Pickeringand Elrod doctrines govern analytically similar
situations in that both attempt to define the extent of a public
employee's rights under the First -Amendment. As a result of the
doctrines' similarity, cases sometimes arise in which either test
could arguably apply. Because these tests can lead to very different
results in practice, a court's choice between Pickering and Elrod
might well resolve the case. Unfortunately, lower courts faced with
the problem have differed on the means of making this choice.
Circuit courts dealing with cases that arguably contain issues
of both political affiliation and overt speech have reached a number of different conclusions about the interrelationship of the two
doctrines. Viewed from a distance, however, these courts have
tended toward one of two larger conceptions: either they have
treated the two lines of cases as falling together on a single unified
spectrum of public employee First Amendment rights, or they have
treated the speech and affiliation precedents as two separate, although similar, doctrines.
A.

The Unified Spectrum Approach

The "unified spectrum" approach, best exemplified by the
4
Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in McBee v Jim Hogg County,5
holds that Elrod and Branti comprise one narrow subset of a larger
5' Id.
62 110 S Ct 2729, 2739 (1990).
" Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, and joined in part
by Justice O'Connor, dissented in Rutan, arguing that Elrod and Branti themselves were
wrongly decided. Id at 2746-59 (Scalia dissenting). Justice Scalia's view may yet become the
view of the Court; two members of the majority in Rutan, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
have since retired.
64 730 F2d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir 1984) (en banc). In McBee, a newly-elected county sheriff fired several deputies who had actively supported the ill-fated re-election campaign of his
predecessor. Id at 1010. The court held that Pickering applied to this case because the deputies lost their jobs a result of more than mere private affiliation. Id at 1015.
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spectrum of employee First Amendment cases governed by Pickering and Connick. Under this view, cases arrange themselves on
that spectrum based on the extent to which the employee's speech
impairs the employer's enterprise. 55 The patronage cases, which involve firings for purely private political affiliation, require no caseby-case weighing under the Pickering test, because they belong on
the extreme end of the spectrum where the balance clearly favors
the employee.5 Because the result of the balance is so clear, the
Elrod court determined that the employee's interest will always
prevail unless the employee is a policymaker whose incongruous
political affiliation endangers the public enterprise. Therefore, the
unified spectrum view regards Elrod as a case in which the Court
applied Pickering itself, deriving from the balancing test a specialized application of the Pickering rule for political patronage
57
cases.
Significantly, under the unified spectrum approach the scope
of the patronage cases is extremely narrow. Because Elrod governs
only the very extreme of the employee's side of the spectrum, it
can only apply to cases of purely private political affiliation in
which the employee never voiced her beliefs.5 8 Cases that involve
any overt expression implicate a greater state interest than existed
in Elrod or Branti,so that the balance no longer yields such a clear
result that the court can apply Elrod-Brantiwithout further analysis. In McBee, for example, the fired employees had actively supported the losing candidate in an election. This presence of overt
expression led the Fifth Circuit to hold that Elrod did not control,
59
and that Pickeringwas the correct test.
16

Id at 1014.

50 Id.
'7 See id. The Fourth Circuit has taken a similar view of the interrelationship of these
two lines of Supreme Court decisions. In Jones v Dodson, 727 F2d 1329 (4th Cir 1984),
another case in which a newly-elected sheriff fired employees who had actively supported
his opponent in the latest election, the court acknowledged in a footnote that the Elrod
patronage cases comprise a narrow subset of the larger set of Pickering employee expression
cases. Id at 1334-35 n 6. At the same time, the court expressed reservations similar to those
of the court in McBee that the patronage test is too rigid for those cases which involve any
element aside from mere private political affiliation. Id. However, where McBee held that
Elrod is inapplicable whenever the employee openly expressed her affiliation, the Jones
court held that causation determines which test applies to an individual case. Id at 1336.
Specifically, it held that if the motivation of the employer in firing the employee was purely
one of political affiliation, then the Elrod-Brantitest is the appropriate one, but if the employer was motivated "to any significant degree by overt speech activity by the public employee," then the Pickering test applies instead. Id.
See McBee, 730 F2d at 1014.
Id at 1014-15.
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The Separate Tests Approach

In contrast to the unified spectrum approach, the "separate
tests" approach holds that Elrod and Pickering govern separate
and distinct situations. For the most part, courts that have taken
this approach have not sought to justify it on a theoretical level,
but have tried instead to distinguish the two doctrines on the facts.
Several circuits have adopted this view in one form or another.
For example, the Eighth Circuit has declined to use Pickering to
decide a case in which a newly-elected official fired several employees for supporting the losing incumbent in an election. 0 The court
held that Elrod's test applies to all cases of political affiliation, of
which this was one."' It did not discuss the possibility that Pickering might apply if the employees had openly expressed their support of the losing incumbent. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has
distinguished between cases of "employee expression," and cases of
"raw political patronage" in which "employees are discharged en
masse by a prospective employer or supervisor. "62 Thus, although
it has not explained how one distinguishes between the two in ambiguous situations, that court considers affiliation and speech to be
entirely separate.6 3
III. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION
It remains to be determined which, if either, of these approaches adheres most faithfully to the Supreme Court's precedent
and to the proper resolution of mixed expression-affiliation cases.
This section analyzes the alternatives and concludes that Elrod
and Branti are properly seen as distinct from the overt expression
cases, and not as a narrow subset of those cases. It concludes that
in deciding which test applies in a given case, the inquiry should
Barnes v Bosley, 745 F2d 501, 503 (8th Cir 1984).
Id at 506. The court made this determination after a discussion of Pickering, in
which it cryptically concluded that "[t]he Pickering balancing test need not be used in determining whether the First Amendment protects political affiliation." Id.
2 Terry v Cook, 866 F2d 373, 376-77 (11th Cir 1989). The court further held that
"[a]lIthough the cases may overlap in some areas, it is important to retain the distinction
between actions that assert employees' right of expression and actions that challenge discharge decisions based on political patronage." Id at 377.
'3 Id. This separate tests approach has sometimes led these courts to narrow the application of Elrod and Branti. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has confined the reach of Elrod
to cases in which an employee suffers because of party loyalty; it has held that the patronage cases do not apply to cases in which an employee opposes the incumbent personally
in a non-partisan election. Thomas v Carpenter,881 F2d 828, 831 (9th Cir 1989). Ironically,
this aspect of the separate test theory mirrors McBee's unified spectrum-both theories narrow the reach of Elrod.
80
81
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properly focus upon the fundamental distinction between conduct
and belief.
A.

The Merits of the Unified Spectrum View

Concededly, the unified spectrum approach makes intuitive
sense. At first glance, the political affiliation protected in Elrod,
Branti, and Rutan appears indistinguishable, for practical purposes, from the forms of political and social expression protected
in Pickering, Connick, and Rankin. Both lines of cases involve
First Amendment rights of public employees and both implicate
similar interests of the state as an employer. Therefore, one might
reasonably conclude that the same test should protect these two
similar rights. From this conclusion it is but a short step to the
proposition that the patronage cases represent a narrow subset of
employee expression cases. Accordingly, the Court must have balanced the Pickering interests (albeit implicitly) and found the balance so lopsided that courts could henceforth apply a straightforward rule in similar cases.
1. Inconsistency with the patronage cases.
A closer look at the patronage cases, however, reveals serious
problems with the unified spectrum approach. Most importantly,
in viewing the patronage cases as an implicit application of Pickering, the spectrum approach is inconsistent with the precedent
upon which it relies. Indeed, it is evident from Elrod that the
Court decided the patronage cases very differently than the speech
cases.
First, in deriving the test in Elrod, the plurality did not rely
on Pickering. In fact, Justice Brennan mentioned Pickering just
once-in a footnote. That footnote described in general terms the
various conditions on public employment held to violate the First
Amendment. 4 If the Court truly intended to resolve Elrod by applying the Pickering test, one would expect at the very least that
the Court would mention that test and identify its source.
Second, Elrod evaluated the employees' right to free political
affiliation differently than Pickering evaluated their right to speak.
While Pickeringbalanced the state's interest in the efficiency of its

64 Elrod, 427 US at 358 n 11. The relevant text reads: "[m]ore broadly, the Court has
held impermissible under the First Amendment the dismissal of a high school teacher for
openly criticizing the Board of Education on its allocation of school funds." Id.
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public enterprise against the employee's free speech,6 5 Elrod eschewed balancing and applied instead a heightened scrutiny test.66
True, Brennan's definition of the heightened scrutiny standard included an element of balancing ("the benefit gained must outweigh
the loss of constitutionally protected rights").6 7 Nevertheless, his
opinion focused on the other elements of that standard: a "paramount" 68 government interest of "vital importance, 6 9 furthered by
the least restrictive means.7 0 The Pickering balance did not explicitly require either of these elements, but asked only whether the
71
government's interest outweighed the employee's right.
Third, Elrod gave dispositive weight to a consideration that
played only a small part in the Pickering test: the nature of the
employee's job. Admittedly, Rankin held that the public and confidential nature of an employee's position affects the relevant
weights in the Pickering balance,7 2 and Pickering itself cited the
character of the relationship between the employer and employee
as one element for a court to consider.73 Nevertheless, neither case
indicated that these considerations alone should control the outcome. 74 In sharp contrast, Elrod held that in the context of a patronage firing the nature of the employee's job and her relationship
to the employer is not only relevant, but always dispositive. 5 Why,
if Elrod merely applied the Pickering test, would it place so much
more value upon this consideration than did Pickering or Rankin?

11

Pickering, 391 US at 568. See Section I.A.

6 Elrod, 427 US at 362.
17

Id at 363.

68 Id at 362.
69 Id.
70

Id at 363.

Arguably, a heightened scrutiny test is itself a form of balancing test in which the
balance is heavily weighted toward the employee. We could view heightened scrutiny as a
test that takes the value of the employee's right as a starting point and then articulates the
requirements-a vital government interest and a least restrictive alternative-that the state
regulation must satisfy to "outweigh" that right. Nonetheless, even if we characterize the
test in Elrod as a balancing test, it differs markedly from the straightforward balancing test
in Pickering. The Pickering test directly weighs the state's interest against the employee's
right, imposes no specific standards on either side, and gives neither side an explicit advantage at the outset.
72 Rankin, 483 US at 390-91.
7
Pickering, 391 US at 569-70.
In fact, Pickering sharply rejected the notion of a categorical approach based upon
the employer-employee relationship. The Court wrote, "[b]ecause of the enormous variety of
fact situations in which critical statements by... public employees may be thought by their
superiors . . . to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or
feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard ....
Id at 569.
" Elrod, 427 US at 367, 375.
71
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Most importantly, Elrod cannot be seen as an application of
the Pickering test because the two lines of cases implicate distinct
government interests. Pickering balanced the employee's right to
speak against the employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of
the public enterprise. 76 Elrod, on the other hand, held that this
efficiency rationale cannot justify firing the employee for belief and
association. 77 Instead, the plurality relied on an expressly separate
interest: that of having politically loyal subordinates. 8 Justice
Brennan explicitly stated that this interest does not relate to the
efficiency of the state enterprise.7 9 Rather, it protects representative government from persons who might try to obstruct "the implementation of policies of the new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate." 80
In sum, the patronage cases cannot be seen as a subset of the
speech cases because (1) they do not rely on the speech cases as
precedent; (2) they use a different method of analysis to judge the
constitutionality of the employer's action; (3) they give greater
weight to the nature of the employee's job; and (4) they involve a
markedly different government interest. Therefore, the unified
spectrum approach errs in interpreting Elrod as an application of
the Pickeringtest-it is not a subset, but a separate and distinct
legal doctrine.
2.

Narrowing Elrod's reach.

The second weakness of the unified spectrum view is its tendency to narrow the reach of Elrod. The spectrum approach has
this effect because first, it must rationalize Elrod's categorical test
within the framework of Pickering, and second, it must impose
Pickering's efficiency interest upon Elrod.
The unified spectrum approach sees Elrod as a member of the
Pickering family-an appropriate stand-in when the Pickering balance clearly favors the employee. Thus, if Elrod is a subset of
Pickering, then Pickering must govern Elrod and we must look to
Pickering to judge Elrod's relationship to other First Amendment
cases on the spectrum.
But the only benchmark that Pickering provides to measure
the placement of cases on the spectrum is the state's interest in

76
7

78

79

Pickering, 391 US at 568.
Elrod, 427 US at 359, 364-67.

Id at 367.
Id.

80 Id.
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efficiency. This state's interest standard is the logical choice because it is the only variable considered in the Pickering line of
cases: by contrast the employee's right is a constant and the public
concern requirement is a simple threshold test unsuited to a broad
spectrum analysis. But the state's efficiency interest is a genuine
variable that will have a measurably different weight in each case.
Therefore, the state's interest must determine the position of each
case on the spectrum.
By definition, the unified spectrum approach views Elrod as
an extreme case, a case in which the balance so clearly favors the
employee that no overt balancing is necessary. This view of Elrod
suggests that its application should be restricted to narrow circumstances-it is an exception to the general rule that Pickering cases
should involve case-by-case balancing. It also suggests that Elrod
itself was insignificant, because Pickering would have protected
the employee anyway.
Moreover, because the measure is the state's efficiency interest, Elrod must be even narrower: it must apply only when the
employee's political affiliation is completely private. Under Pickering, the state's interest is that of "promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."" l The Court
cited the effect of the employee's expression on discipline by his
immediate supervisors and harmony among his co-workers.82 It
also considered the effect of the speech on the employee's job performance and on the general operation of the state enterprise."
Similarly, in Connick, the Court pointed to the potential for
speech to disrupt a public office and undermine the authority of
the employer. 84 By contrast, a case in which an employee's "objectionable" political affiliation has these effects is difficult to imagine. Therefore, if the state's interest is only that of efficiency, it has
a negligible interest in regulating political affiliation, and the balance so favors the employee that Elrod will apply. But when political affiliation combines with overt speech that bolsters the state's
interest, Elrod can no longer govern. The unified spectrum approach thus restricts Elrod to the narrow situation in which the

8'Pickering, 391 US at 568.
82 Id at 569-70.

8' Id at 572-73.
",Connick, 461 US at 154.
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employee never speaks about nor advocates her particular
affiliation 55
One might argue that this narrowing of Elrod is a strength,
rather than a weakness, of the unified spectrum approach. Narrowing Elrod in favor of Pickering and Connick lessens the overall
protection of public employees' First Amendment rights;86 those
who stress the government's need to control its employees might
favor this development. Nevertheless, such straightforward policy
justifications should not be able to overcome binding precedents.
To hold otherwise would be to increase the government's authority
to fire employees by limiting binding precedent counter to the
spirit of that precedent.
This is indeed what the unified spectrum courts have
done-they have created an approach that is at odds with the
spirit of Elrod, Branti, and Rutan.s7 These cases represent a clear
choice on the part of the Court to make political affiliation dismissals subject to a different standard of scrutiny than speech dismissals. In fact, Justice Scalia's dissent in Rutan objects to the Elrod
regime for precisely that reason. 8 The Rutan Court's rejection of
his arguments illustrates how sharply the unified spectrum approach's narrowing effect conflicts with the spirit of the precedents
it narrows.
Notably, instead of narrowing the Elrod line of cases, the Supreme Court is in fact moving in the opposite direction. Rutan
represents a broadening of the scope of Elrod and Branti to reach
patronage practices short of dismissal. Thus, Rutan demonstrates
that the Court is moving in the direction of expanding, not narrowing, the scope of the patronage cases.

5

The courts espousing the unified spectrum approach have in practice restricted it in

this fashion. See McBee, 730 F2d at 1012, 1014-15; Jones, 727 F2d at 1334-35 n 6. Jones,
however, applies a causation standard that is somewhat more flexible; it holds that Pickering controls only if the employer was influenced "to any significant degree by overt expres-

sion." 727 F2d at 1336.
81 The unified spectrum's narrow construction of Elrod constricts public employees'
First Amendment rights by making more cases subject to the conventional Pickering balancing test. Although Pickering is not unkind to employees, it is less advantageous for
nonpolicymakers (the large majority of public employees) than is Elrod, under which they

win every time.
" Indeed, a dissenting judge in one of the unified spectrum cases argued that this approach "undermines the First Amendment bulwark of Elrod and Branti." McBee, 730 F2d
at 1025 (Rubin dissenting).
88

Rutan, 110 S Ct at 2746-47 (Scalia dissenting).
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Internal inconsistency of the unified spectrum approach.

Even if we were to assume that the unified spectrum approach
correctly holds that Pickering's standard governs patronage cases
and that both Elrod and Pickering examine the same government
interest, the spectrum would still lack internal consistency. Admittedly, the inconsistency does not appear when we analyze the
rights of nonpolicymakers. As we have seen, the spectrum places
nonpolicymakers fired for political affiliation at the far end of the
spectrum (on the employee's side), because their exercise of First
Amendment rights has little or no effect on office efficiency. So far,
this matches what we would expect from Elrod under the unified
spectrum approach. The internal tidiness of this wedding of Pickering and Elrod breaks down, however, when one examines the approach's effect on policymakers. Under Elrod, policymaking employees may always be dismissed solely because of their political
affiliation, but under Pickering's balancing test the responsibility
of the employee's position is simply one factor for the court to consider. Therefore, in order to fit Elrod into the Pickering-based
spectrum, a court must hold that policymakers' political affiliation
so imperils government efficiency as always to outweigh the employee's First Amendment rights.
We have already seen that political affiliation carries little risk
of harming day-to-day office efficiency,8 9 so it is difficult to believe
that enough danger exists to justify such a sharp distinction between policymakers and nonpolicymakers. But the problem is even
deeper: the unified spectrum's reading of Elrod moves from
strained to unworkable when political affiliation combines with
overt speech. In the case of a nonpolicymaker, overt speech brings
the case outside the narrow reach of Elrod and into the traditional
Pickering balance; when the employee speaks, the state's interest
is no longer so slight as to fit on the very extreme end of the employee's side of the spectrum.9 0 But what if the employee is a policymaker? For policymakers, the unified spectrum approach should
demand the opposite result. Elrod holds that the state's interest in
firing a policymaker for mere political beliefs is so strong that any
such action is always constitutional. Logically, that interest grows
even stronger when the affiliation combines with overt expression.
Therefore, if no Pickering balance was necessary absent the overt
expression, the presence of that expression should make the bal-

"' See text accompanying notes 37-40.
'0 See Section II.A.
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ance even less necessary.9 1 Nevertheless, unless we ignore Pickering's and Rankin's mandate that the nature of the employee's job
is but one factor in the balance,9 2 we cannot avoid applying the
Pickering test to a policymaker's overt speech.
Therefore, the unified spectrum view is internally inconsistent.
First, in order to place patronage cases within the Pickering standard, it asserts the same governmental interest-efficiency-in firing employees for both speech and political affiliation. Second, in
order to justify the categorical test it must accord the state less
interest in firing nonpolicymakers for affiliation than for speech.
But at the same time, in order to follow the manifest holdings of
Elrod and Pickering, it must hold that the state has stronger
grounds for firing policymakers solely for their affiliation than it
has for firing them either solely for their speech or for their affiliation mixed with speech. We can cure these inconsistencies only by
recognizing that Pickering and Elrod do not belong in a single
spectrum. Instead, they protect different rights and involve different state interests.
B.

Two First Amendment Rights

We have seen that the spectrum approach is inconsistent both
with itself and with the spirit and language of the Court's precedents, and that it unjustifiably narrows the reach of the patronage
cases. These problems exist because the proponents of the unified
spectrum approach have ignored crucial differences between the
two lines of cases in an effort to place Elrod within the domain of
Pickering.Therefore, the unified spectrum view is unworkable, and
we must advocate some form of the separate tests approach. But
what form? What distinguishes Elrod from Pickering?
The language of the Supreme Court's decisions indicates that
the distinction between the speech cases and the patronage cases
lies in the rights they protect. Pickeringholds that a school board
may not fire a teacher for exercising his right to free speech-or,
more generally, free expression." In contrast, Elrod and Branti
both clearly hold that patronage firings infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of freedom of belief and association. For exam91 The McBee and Jones courts failed to recognize this argument. They held that the
specialized Elrod test has no application to cases of mixed speech and affiliation, regardless
of whether the employee is a policymaker. McBee, 730 F2d at 1014-16; Jones, 727 F2d at
1336.
"2 See Section I.A.
" Pickering, 391 US at 574.
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ple, in Elrod Justice Brennan wrote that "[t]he cost of the practice
of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and
9 5
association, 9 4 and in Branti the Court reaffirmed this protection.
After analyzing cases holding that the government could not dismiss a public employee for expression, the majority in Branti held
that "[i]f the First Amendment protects a public employee from
discharge based on what he has said, it must also protect him from
discharge based on what he believes." 9 6 This language indicates
that Elrod and Branti protect belief, which we may distinguish
from the expressive conduct in Pickering.
1.

A fact-based distinction?

Concededly, establishing that the Court intended Elrod and
Branti to govern belief and association does not necessarily mean
that it meant to distinguish these rights from the right to free expression. Indeed, one might argue that Elrod and Branti eschew
the Pickering balancing test not because the rights at issue differ,
but because the cases look different on the facts. For example, the
patronage cases generally involve multiple firings after a change of
administration, 97 while the speech cases arise any time the speech
occurs-even if the most recent election occurred long ago.9 8 In addition, patronage dismissals result from generalized partisan political concerns, while speech-related firings involve specific incidents
of employee behavior. These differences might suggest that even if
we decide to adopt separate tests, we should distinguish between
the two lines of cases on the facts.
This purely fact-based distinction, however, is less than satisfying because it will not solve the problem of ambiguity between
the two lines of cases. Instead, it begs the question: which facts are
important? How similar to the facts of Elrod must be the facts of
the case at hand before we will select the test in Elrod over the
test in Pickering? In practice, courts that have used the separate
tests approach have seemed to adopt this fact-based distinction,
and they have come to diverse conclusions on this very issue. For

Elrod, 427 US at 355. Brennan further states: "Our concern with the impact of patronage on political belief and association does not occur in the abstract, for political belief
and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment."
Id at 356 (footnote omitted).
" Branti, 445 US at 513 (footnote omitted) (The plurality in Elrod "analyzed the impact of a political patronage system on freedom of belief and association.").
91 Id at 515 (footnote omitted).
97 See, for example, Branti,445 US at 509.
98See, for example, Connick, 461 US at 140-42.
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example, one court has distinguished between Elrod and Pickering
on the basis of how many employees were fired.9 9 Another court
has restricted Elrod to cases of party politics, declining to apply
the patronage cases to a non-partisan opponent of an elected official. 100 Neither of these cases clearly explains why these particular
facts, and not others, should be determinative.
Instead of distinguishing these cases on the basis of fuzzy fact
patterns, a better approach may be available. A "rights-based" distinction between freedom of speech and freedom of association-or, more generally, between freedom of expressive conduct
and freedom of belief-could lead to a test with clearer boundaries,
a stronger theoretical basis, and much support in the Court's
precedents. Therefore, we may be able to explain the different
tests in Pickering and Elrod by distinguishing between the rights
they protect. If we can do so, we may improve. upon the separate
tests approach.
2.

Freedom of association.

The Supreme Court has long distinguished between the right
to speak and the right to associate. While freedom of speech appears in the text of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has
inferred freedom of association from rights expressly granted, such
as the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. 10' That the Court
has found it necessary to recognize this implied right demonstrates
its belief that the expressed rights do not adequately protect certain First Amendment principles. Indeed, the Court has described
the right of association as prior to the right of expression and necessary to its existence. 0 2 Citizens frequently associate in order to
express their views more effectively; therefore, if the government
could control association, it could "stifle the flow of democratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources."' 0 3

" Terry v Cook, 866 F2d 373, 376-77 (11th Cir 1989) (Elrod applies where an employer
fires employees "en masse").
100 Thomas v Carpenter,881 F2d 828, 831 (9th Cir 1989).
101 See, for example, Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 15 (1976); NAACP v Alabama, 357 US
449, 460 (1958). See also Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak, and J. Nelson Young, 3 Treatise on ConstitutionalLaw: Substance and Procedure§ 20.41 at 199-208 (West, 1986); Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw § 12-26 at 1010-15 (Foundation, 2d ed 1988).
1o See Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 622 (1984), ("[a]n individual's
freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances
could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.").
103 Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183, 191 (1952).
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Furthermore, the Court has explicitly defined the right to free
association as separate from (albeit related to) the right to free
speech. For example, it has held that the "right of free association
[is] a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which,
like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society."' 1 4 To say
that the two rights are "closely allied" implies that they are not
the same right. In addition, freedom of association has appeared in
several contexts, 10 5 and has its own precedents separate from the
freedom of speech cases.
Of the association cases which preceded Elrod, the loyalty
oath cases most closely relate to the patronage cases. These precedents define the extent to which a government employer may constitutionally deny employment to persons because of their associations. More precisely, they examine whether and how employment
may be conditioned on one's swearing nonaffiliation with certain
organizations. 0 6 Although a full discussion of the loyalty oath
cases is outside the scope of this Comment, it is important to note
that the government actions challenged in these cases did not directly infringe upon expression. Instead, they infringed upon the
employees' right to free political association-a right that exists
whether or not the affected persons express their associational
ties.1 0 7 In other words, the right protected is the right of belief: an
employee may believe whatever she wishes, and she may associate
herself with whatever group or idea she wishes. While the Court
may protect that belief for instrumental reasons, i.e., in order to
promote the expression of such beliefs, it is the belief itself which
receives direct protection.
This highlights an important difference between the rights of
association and speech. For the purposes of associational rights, it
is immaterial whether the employee actually expresses her beliefs
or associations. By contrast, in Pickering and the other speech
10 Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 486 (1960).
"I See, for example, Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609 (1984), which involves the freedom not to associate.
I0" Important loyalty oath cases which preceded Elrod include Wieman v Updegraff,
344 US 183 (1952); Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479 (1960); Elfbrandt v Russell, 384 US 11
(1966); Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589 (1967); United States v Robel, 389 US
258 (1967); and Cole v Richardson, 405 US 676 (1972).
107 For example, in Wieman, 344 US at 184 n 1, state employees challenged an

Oklahoma statute which required them to swear, inter alia, "that I do not advocate, nor am
I a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the
overthrow of the Government of the United States ....
" The oath did not require that the
employee's advocacy or membership be openly expressed;'the belief and association itself
were enough to disqualify an individual from state employment.
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cases, it is the expression itself which provokes the government to
retaliate, and which the Court seeks to protect. Therefore, in the
loyalty oath context, the right at issue differs from the freedom of
expression protected in Pickering.
3.

Freedom of association in the patronage cases.

Like the right of association in the loyalty oath context, the
right to political affiliation protected in Elrod, Branti, and Rutan
is a right of belief rather than expression. Indeed, we should view
the patronage cases as an outgrowth of the loyalty oath cases,
rather than as a relative of the speech cases. For example, while
the plurality in Elrod merely mentions Pickering in passing in a
footnote, it cites the loyalty oath cases extensively. 10 8 This reliance
on the loyalty oath cases suggests that the Court viewed the patronage cases as more closely allied to the loyalty oath cases than
to the speech cases-a sensible conclusion if the right at issue in
the latter differs qualitatively from that at issue in Elrod and
Branti.
Furthermore, while the state's interest in Elrod diverges from
the efficiency interest advanced in Pickering, there is no such incongruity between Elrod and the loyalty oath cases. In both cases,
the state's interest is that of having politically loyal employees. 0 9
Significantly, this distinction between efficiency and loyalty helps
to demonstrate the deeper distinction between expressive conduct
and belief. The efficiency concerns in Pickering, Connick, and
Rankin match well with concerns about employee conduct. Because expressive conduct may be overt, noisy, and directly provocative, it can affect the relationships between the employee and her
supervisors, co-workers, and employer to a much greater extent
than mere belief. Furthermore, expressive conduct can impair office efficiency by distracting the enterprise from public service. Belief does not by itself distract.
On the other hand, political loyalty inherently lies in the
realm of subjective belief and association. Although many people
tend to act in accordance with their beliefs, the word "loyalty" implies a certain mental condition which exists regardless of conduct.
It follows that the government's interest in having politically loyal
108See, for example, Elrod,427 US at 365, citing Wieman, 344 US 183; Elfbrandt, 384
US 11; and Keyishian, 385 US 589. Citations to these and other freedom of association cases
appear throughout the Elrod plurality opinion.

1*1 See Wieman, 344 US at 188 ("we have had occasion to consider legislation aimed at
safeguarding the public service from disloyalty").
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subordinates is an interest in regulating belief. In the patronage
cases, even though the government may fire the employee to guard
against conduct which threatens its policies, it is the belief itself
that prompts the employer to act.
This distinction between expressive conduct and belief is the
true difference between the two lines of cases. Over the years, the
Court has inferred a right of free association for the specific purpose of protecting political beliefs and associations that have not
yet been expressed or that the government has abridged directly
without regard to whether they have been overtly expressed. By
contrast, the Court has looked to the right to free speech to protect
the overt expression that the government wishes to abridge or penalize. These distinguishable rights of belief and speech in Elrod
and Pickeringrespectively implicate the distinct government interests of political loyalty and efficiency. The difference between
these interests, in turn, creates the need for separate tests in the
patronage and speech contexts. It should also not be surprising
that Elrod gives the employee greater protection than does Pickering. Given that the Court views associational rights as a necessary
precondition of speech rights, and given that belief and association
are one step further than speech from conduct dangerous to the
state, association should receive greater immunity from state regulation. The test in Elrod may reflect the attitude that belief and
association are both more fundamental to the free exchange of
ideas and less dangerous to the state than speech.
Therefore, it is these different First Amendment rights that
distinguish the two lines of cases from one another. We can now
undertake to create a framework for determining which right is implicated in an ambiguous case.

IV.
A.

SCOPE OF ELROD AND PICKERING

Making the Rights-Based Distinction

Once we conclude that Pickering and Elrod govern different
rights, the logical extension is to apply Pickering whenever the
state fires an employee for expressive conduct, and to apply Elrod
whenever the state fires an employee for holding political beliefs
contrary to those of her employer. In an ambiguous case, we should
try to determine what caused the employer to fire his employee-was it the employee's expression itself, or rather the em-
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ployee's political beliefs (perhaps as revealed in the content of that
expression)?11 o
On this count, the facts of Branti v Finkel,"' the second patronage decision, provide an instructive example. Branti, the
newly-appointed public defender, fired six of the nine employees
left over from the previous administration. All six belonged to the
political party of the previous public defender; the three employees
retained were members of Branti's own party." 2 In that case, the
district court readily concluded that Branti had dismissed the em3
ployees on the basis of their political affiliation."1
But let us alter the facts slightly. Imagine that of the six who
lost their jobs, two of the fired employees had actively campaigned
against Branti and the other four had not. Here, since Branti fired
the non-expressive employees along with the expressive ones, the
cause of the firings was still affiliation and not speech. On the
other hand, if Branti was aware of the political affiliations of the
four who did not campaign but fired only the two employees who
campaigned actively, then his motivation in firing was probably expression. We know this because the four employees who shared the
political affiliation, but not the speech, of the fired employees
nonetheless retained their jobs.
The Paula Partisan hypothetical with which I began this Comment presents a more ambiguous case. Remember that Paula said,
"[a]s a member of the Platypus Party of America, I support Ida
Incumbent over Carl Contender," and we can assume that this
statement led to her dismissal. To determine which test to apply,
we must ask the following question: Did Carl fire Paula because of
the expression itself, which might have offended Carl or led him
to think her speech would sour office relationships, or did he fire
her because the statement revealed that she was a member of the
Platypus Party? If the former, then Pickeringapplies; if the latter,
then Elrod is the appropriate test.
As in the Branti example, we might uncover Carl's motivations by looking at whether he fired any other employees. If Carl
fired everyone he knew to be a member of the Platypus Party, then

"IAlthough

we may often have difficulty distinguishing between possible causes of a

firing in an individual case, particularly when an employee loudly expresses her political
beliefs, we should not be daunted by this complication. Indeed, it is always difficult in employment cases, where the employer's motivation is commonly ambiguous, to gauge the true
cause of an employee's dismissal.
"1 445 US 507 (1980).
112

Id at 509-10.

,,3Id at 510.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[59:897

he probably also fired Paula for that same reason. On the other
hand, if Carl retained other known members of the Platypus Party,
then he probably fired Paula for her expression. However, if Paula
was the only known member of the Platypus Party or if Carl fired
some Platypi but not others, the factfinder will face a more difficult task. But at least we know the right question to ask, even if
that question will not always be easy to answer: Was Paula fired
for her conduct, or was she fired for her beliefs?
B.

The Ramifications of the Rights-Based Distinction

This view of Elrod and Pickering as separate tests governing
separate rights leads to a broader application of Elrod than the
unified spectrum approach. Because Elrod applies to patronage
dismissal cases which infringe the rights of belief and association,
we need not limit its reach to cases that do not involve any overt
expression. Instead, Elrod will apply whenever the state discharges
an employee for reasons of belief or association, even if the employee incidentally manifested her views or loyalties. Of course, we
should be wary of situations that bear no factual resemblance to
the patronage cases. The right to free association is broader than
the reach of Elrod and, although the patronage cases may be relevant precedent, they do not govern every aspect of that right. They
do not, for instance, supersede the loyalty oath cases or other fact
situations directly governed by other existing precedent.
Nonetheless, where a dismissal for belief and association does
not fall directly under some other precedent, courts should not
mechanically confine the scope of the patronage cases to the facts
of Elrod and Branti. For example, a court should not hesitate to
apply Elrod to a case in which an employer discovers an employee's objectionable political affiliation and fires her for that affiliation halfway through the employer's term in office. Although
Elrod specifically addresses patronage firings of the ordinary variety-those that occur immediately after a change in administration-the same considerations exist when the firing occurs later, as
long as the same unconstitutional motivation engendered the
dismissal.
V.

PROPOSED CAUSATION TEST

The court hearing Paula Partisan's case will have to determine
the exact cause of her firing: it will have to decide between two
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potentially unconstitutional reasons for dismissal. 11 4 Although the
Supreme Court has not heard a case similar to Paula's, its opinion
in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v Doyle11 5 provides a test
for causation in cases of "mixed motive." Mixed motive cases arise
when an employer dismisses an employee and the court must ascertain whether the reason for dismissal was a constitutionally protected interest or some form of misconduct for which the employer
could legally fire his employee." 6 In Mt. Healthy, a school board
declined to renew the contract of one of its teachers.1 7 Its action
was due, in part, to the teacher's expression; like Pickering, Doyle
had complained to the media about school board policy." 8 The
school board was also unhappy with Doyle because of several incidents of conduct that were not protected by the First Amendment.1 1 9 This was a classic case of mixed motive.
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that in
such a case the plaintiff-employee bears the initial burden of showing that the protected speech was a "substantial" or "motivating"
factor in the employer's decision to fire him.'2 0 If the plaintiff
meets this burden, then the defendant-employer must show that it
would have taken the same action against the employee even had
the protected expression not occurred.' 2 ' Only if the employee
meets his burden and the employer fails to do likewise will the
Pickering test apply.
My proposed test for deciding between two impermissible
motivations for dismissal borrows from this Mt. Healthy test for
deciding between a permissible and an impermissible motivation.
To illustrate the mechanics of this test, let us return again to Partisan v Contender. Carl may have fired Paula because of her political affiliation with the Platypus Party, or because she spoke openly

114

The unconstitutional reasons are, of course, speech and affiliation. In practice, the

employer will usually argue that he fired Paula for a permissible reason-for example, because she had a poor record for punctuality-in order to escape liability under both Pickering and Elrod.
115 429 US 274 (1977).
11
Mixed motive cases also frequently arise in employment contexts other than the
First Amendment. See, for example, NLRB v TransportationManagement Corp., 462 US
393 (1983) (alleged firing for union activities in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act); Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228 (1989) (alleged firing on the basis of sex
discrimination).
117 Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 282.
11 Id at 281-82.
Id at 281-83.
120 Id at 287.
121 Id.
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to the press against Carl Contender, or for some combination of
these reasons. How do we decide?
We must first inquire whether the employee was a "policymaker"-in Branti's terms, an employee for whom political affiliation would be a reasonable job requirement. The court should
resolve this as a question of law, because the inquiry involves policy concerns and relies upon precedent that a jury would have difficulty understanding.' 2 2 The court should determine the employee's
status at the outset because the resolution of this issue will determine the positions of the parties. For example, should the court
determine that Paula is a policymaker, Paula will prefer the Pickering test over the Elrod test; thus she will argue that Carl dismissed her for her words to the press, and not because of her political affiliation. If, on the other hand, the court should determine
that Paula is not a policymaker, she will argue for the Elrod test.
The next inquiry parallels the procedure in Mt. Healthy. Let
us assume that the court determines that Paula was a policymaker.
Paula will argue that speech rather than mere political affiliation
prompted her dismissal, because policymakers cannot recover
under Elrod. Such a claim calls for a straightforward application of
Mt. Healthy: Paula carries the initial burden of proving that her
overt speech was a substantial or motivating factor in Carl's decision. If she succeeds, Carl must prove that he would have reached
the same decision even had she never spoken to the press. If Paula
meets her burden, and Carl fails to meet his, the court must apply
the Pickering balance.
Now let us assume that the court determines that Paula was
not a policymaker. She may try to recover under either Elrod or
Pickering. She will prefer Elrod, however, because under that test
Carl's action is presumptively unconstitutional.1 23 Therefore, Paula
will bear the initial burden of proving that her political beliefs
were a substantial or motivating factor in Carl's decision. If she
meets this burden, Carl will have to prove that he would have
made the same decision even if Paula shared his beliefs. If Carl
fails to convince the factfinder, then Elrod applies and Paula will
prevail.

122 In fact, courts regularly decide this question as a matter of law. Jimenez Fuentes v

Torres Gaztambide, 807 F2d 236, 239-47 (1st Cir 1986) (court considered generally whether

the position relates to partisan political concerns and the inherent powers and privileges of
the position of regional director of civil rights office).
123 Elrod, 427 US at 372-73.
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However, in this second case, if Carl successfully proves that
he would have fired Paula regardless of her affiliation, Paula can
press the Pickering claim. Again, the court will apply Mt. Healthy.
Paula must prove that her overt speech was a substantial or motivating factor in Carl's decision. If she succeeds, Carl must prove
that he would have fired her for some permissible reason regardless
of her speech. If Carl succeeds in proving this, he will prevail; if he
fails, the court must apply the Pickering balance.
CONCLUSION

Both Elrod and Pickering potentially apply to cases in which
a public employer fires an employee for exercising her First
Amendment rights. However, the patronage cases and the overt
speech cases govern different First Amendment rights and implicate different state interests. Therefore, courts should apply them
separately to cases that involve the appropriate rights and
interests.
The test from the patronage cases should apply to discharges
for political beliefs and associations. By contrast, the balancing
test from the speech cases should apply to firings for overt expression. The courts can best serve this approach by using a modification of the Mt. Healthy causation test in mixed motive cases. The
Mt. Healthy test provides a procedure for determining causation
consistent with the Supreme Court's method in other First
Amendment cases.
This approach would provide a sensible and workable framework for differentiating between the two lines of Supreme Court
authority and applying them to ambiguous cases. At the same
time, it would prevent the misguided narrowing of public employees' First Amendment rights. If adopted, it would thus promote
the freedom of citizens while reducing confusion among the courts.

